Ghana Agribusiness Playbook← Marine Fisheries
The chain in one relationship: the woman who finances the trip also sets its price.
Marine Fisheries · Pillar 06

Value Chain Analysis

The person who lands the fish keeps a 7.4 per cent margin, the thinnest in the chain and a fraction of the processor's 45 per cent. The only credit either can reach is an advance from the woman who buys the catch at her own price.
Value chain analysis · Pillar 06

Ghana’s fish chain does not leak value at any one link. It leaks where there is no link at all: no grading, no cold chain outside four harbours, no buyer who pays for quality. The person who lands the fish earns the thinnest margin, a fraction of the processor’s, and the only credit either can reach is an advance from the woman who will buy the catch at her price. She is also the one actor already placed to capture what the chain is losing.

Wide banner of a Ghanaian fish landing beach at dawn, a fishmonger woman negotiating price with a canoe crew over a basket of small pelagic fish, smoking racks and canoes in the background, documentary photograph
Who controls the transaction
The chain in one relationship: the woman who finances the trip also sets its price.
7.4%
the margin the fisher keeps, thinnest of any actor in the chain
45%
the processor's margin, the highest of any link
GH¢2.6bn
the post-harvest value loss the chain is currently losing

🐟 The chain in one view, and how thin the evidence for it is 🐟

Ghana’s marine chain is not a relay of margins but separate transactions tied by credit, the same person often financier, processor, trader and retailer at once, the fish changing hands with no written contract. Value is captured by controlling who buys the fish as it lands.

The whole chain is documented by one field study of the sardinella supply chain1, one journal paper on the small pelagic fishery2, one on tuna3 and a fourth on cross-border trade reaching only the inland leg4. Almost everything quoted as Ghanaian value chain research traces to this handful.

Table 15: The marine fish chain from landing to consumer, one row a link
Chain linkWho operates itThe price or margin signalWhere value leaksThe opening inside the break
Landing and beach saleCanoe crew selling to a fishmonger, often the woman who prefinanced the tripThe fishmonger sets the price; the fisher keeps a 7.4 per cent marginSet by the lender, not the market, so the fisher cannot capture qualityA buyer and a lender who compete with the advance by also guaranteeing the sale
ProcessingAbout 33,000 women, mostly smoking small pelagicsProcessor margin about 45 per cent, far above the fisher'sFish priced by size, not weight, so a better oven that shrinks it loses moneyA grade and a premium that pay for quality, which no buyer currently offers
Cold chain and storageCold stores at Tema and Takoradi, and imports; almost none for artisanal fishFresh sardinella must sell within 3 to 12 hoursNo cold chain outside four harbours, so fresh fish travels only a few kilometresLanding-site chilling that moves fish out of the downgraded grade before value is lost
Domestic and inland tradeWomen traders and market queens, moving fish by tricycle, taxi and head porterPriced by size and by the market queen's daily callNo purpose-built transport and no aggregator to the formal marketAggregation into a graded, certified line for supermarkets and exporters
Cross-border tradeWomen traders across the Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire bordersA basket of smoke-dried fish at about GH¢130 in 2018Informal and untaxed, about 6,000 tonnes a year leaving unrecordedFormalising a corridor women already run, with grade and traceability attached
Export (tuna)Three Tema canneries, financed in part by women intermediariesEU retail captures about 74 per cent of gross profit a tonneThe value added and captured sits at the European shelf, not in GhanaHolding EU access through certification, which arrived for the tuna fleet in 2026

Sources: Nunoo et al. (2015); Asiedu et al. (2022); Drury O'Neill, Asare and Aheto (2018); Owusu (2019); Coastal Resources Center (2021); United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service (2022); Ayilu and Nyiawung (2022). Margin and price figures carry their basis in the sections that follow.

What this means. Read the chain by who controls the transaction, not by who adds the most processing. The margin sits with whoever can decide who buys the fish, and along this chain that is the woman financier, not the fisher or the processor. An entrant who plans to add value by processing, without first securing the right to buy the fish, has planned the easy half.

🐟 The landing transaction, and the financier who sets the price 🐟

The canoe sells to a fishmonger, often the woman who prefinanced the trip, so the first sale is a loan repayment and she dictates the price when the catch lands at odd hours5; the fisher “did not have the luxury to dictate their own price”6.

That is why the fisher keeps the least: a 7.4 per cent margin against the processor’s 45 per cent, with about 93 per cent of revenue going back out as operating cost, 53 per cent of it fuel7. The catch then splits roughly a third to fishmongers supplying processors, a third to processors, the rest to wholesalers and retailers8.

A Ghanaian fishmonger woman counting cedi banknotes while a canoe crew member holds a basket of small pelagic fish beside a beached canoe at dawn, documentary photograph
The first sale is a loan repayment
She sets the price: the advance is repaid before the fish is weighed.
7.4%
fisher's margin against the processor's 45 per cent
53%
of revenue going straight back out as fuel cost
Monthly profit by actor along the small pelagic chain, from fisherfolk to fish processors
Figure 15 Monthly profit by actor along the small pelagic chain, and the margin gap between the two ends
What this shows

The person who lands the fish keeps the least of it. A 7.4 per cent margin against the processor’s 45 per cent is the price of being financed by the buyer, whose advance fixes the margin before the fish is landed. Every value-capture opening in this pillar sits to the right of the first bar.

The beach price is partly an office: the Konkohemaa, the queen fishmonger, negotiates the day’s price alongside the chief fisherman, so it is set by a recognised authority, not open auction9. That authority is weakening, and it is the layer an entrant would negotiate access through.

Why this link is the pivot of the whole Ghanaian chain

The women who finance the trips are the single most important actors in this chain. At the Tema cold stores the “Big Mammies” handled up to a quarter of landed tuna, and prefinancing sometimes committed 50 to 100 per cent of an industrial company’s landings10. The same holds for the artisanal chain.

The one relationship an entrant must understand first.The prize and the trap are the same actor. The woman who prefinances the trip is the only credit instrument that functions at scale in this chain, and she caps the fisher’s margin precisely because she also guarantees his sale. Any lender or aggregator entering here must replace both halves of what she provides, the cash and the certain buyer; a loan that leaves the fisher to find his own market replaces only the cheaper half. Pillar 5 prices the hidden interest rate inside that advance; this pillar’s point is that it also owns the price.

🐟 Processing: where most of the fish goes, and why the best oven loses money 🐟

Most Ghanaian fish is smoked, where the processor’s margin is struck, far above the fisher’s: 72 per cent of landed quantity is smoked, 14 per cent frozen, 13 per cent sold fresh and 1 per cent salted11. Smoked fish keeps eight to ten months, the real cold-chain substitute, and the reason the processor, not the fisher, captures the value storage would earn.

The chain’s central defect is a missing price signal. The Ahotor oven cuts carcinogenic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in smoked fish to 10.93 micrograms a kilogram against 84 for the Chorkor, inside the European limit, and burns less wood12, yet processors report its prices do not compensate for the investment and it shrinks a fish sold by size13.

Only 76 of 520 Ahotor ovens were built without a subsidy of 88 per cent or more14. Ghana has the beginning of a grade that would change that arithmetic: a Safe Fish Certification and Licensing Scheme certified 159 facilities in 202315. What a certified fish sells for against an uncertified one remains unmeasured.

Women smoking small pelagic fish over traditional wood-fired ovens at a busy Ghanaian landing-beach processing area, racks of round sardinella, smoke rising, documentary photograph
72% of the catch, smoked
The real margin: struck here, far above what the fisher keeps.
72%
of landed quantity is smoked, the dominant product form
76 of 520
Ahotor ovens built without an 88% subsidy or more

The grade that would pay for everything else. The missing product in this chain is a grade, and it is cheap to create. The technology to make clean, safe, exportable smoked fish already exists and is sitting idle because the market pays by size and not by quality. An entrant who introduces a grading standard, signs an offtaker who pays a premium against it, and finances the oven against that offtake contract, unlocks the value the Ahotor was supposed to release and could not. The 159 certified facilities of 2023 are a ready supply base with no premium buyer behind them yet. The digital form of the same play is the price-and-grade data layer set out in Pillar 7, which makes a grade legible enough to pay for.

🐟 The missing middle: the layer of the chain that has no operator 🐟

Four links a functioning fish chain would carry are absent. There is no cold chain between beach and market for artisanal fish, so fresh sardinella must sell within three to twelve hours and travels only a few kilometres16. There is no purpose-built transport: a 2021 survey found no vehicle designed to carry fish17. There is no grade and no quality-based price, and no aggregator to the formal market.

The four links a functioning fish chain would carry, and does not: landing, processing, domestic trade and cross-border/inland
Figure 16 The four links a functioning fish chain would carry, and does not
What this shows

The value does not leak at a link, it leaks where a link is missing. Because no one grades the fish or pays for quality, no one can justify the equipment that would raise it, which is why the safer oven that shrinks the fish loses the processor money. Fill any one of these four gaps and the fish that is currently downgraded stays in grade; fill none and the loss is structural.

The cold chain that exists runs almost entirely on imports and tuna. Cold stores at Tema and Takoradi buy, freeze and store about 90 per cent of marine fish landed in Ghana, tuna excepted, while the artisanal beaches that supply most of what the country eats have almost none18. The Fisheries Commission’s 2026 mapping puts Winneba, Apam, Mumford, Keta, Ada and several Volta beaches in a “little or no cold storage” category19. The cold chain earns on foreign fish, in two ports, and none of it reaches the canoe.

The chain’s largest loss sits here, and it is value more than fish. The national post-harvest loss assessment puts total loss at 22.5 per cent of total fish production, worth GH¢2.6 billion, with the marine sector carrying 95 per cent of the loss20, while the value chain study of the same small pelagics reports less than 5 per cent post-harvest loss, on the reasoning that all landed catch is used, directly by humans and indirectly through the poultry and aquaculture sectors21. They do not contradict: one counts fish physically thrown away, of which there is little because downgraded fish is still sold, the other counts value destroyed when fish drops a grade. A business on the physical reading chases a five per cent problem; one on the value reading chases a much larger one, and the fix is a grade and a cold link, not a bigger freezer.

Workers loading crates of frozen fish into a cold-storage warehouse at Tema harbour, stacked pallets and a forklift, industrial refrigeration doors, documentary photograph
90% runs on imports and tuna
The cold chain that exists, and none of it reaches the canoe.
90%
of stored marine fish is imports and tuna, not artisanal catch
GH¢2.6bn
national post-harvest loss, marine's share about 95 per cent

🐟 Domestic and cross-border trade: the corridor women already run 🐟

Women traders loading baskets of smoke-dried fish onto a tro-tro minibus at a busy West African border crossing market, sacks and baskets stacked, documentary photograph
A working, women-run network
The corridor already exists: untaxed, unrecorded, and entirely theirs to formalise.
~6,000 t
of processed small pelagics crossing informally each year
223 of 223
surveyed cross-border traders were women

Once smoked, the fish travels, and the trade is almost entirely women’s. The informal cross-border trade in processed small pelagics across the Ghana, Togo and Benin borders was about 6,000 tonnes a year worth around US$14 million, and every one of the 223 traders surveyed was a woman22. Pricing carries the same size-not-weight convention that punishes the Ahotor oven: 17.1 per cent of traders set price by size and only 0.7 per cent by weight. A basket of smoke-dried fish sold for about GH¢130 in 2018.

That corridor is a formalisation opportunity mistaken for a leak. Value leaves untaxed through a working, women-run network across Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire that is itself the asset. It should not be confused with imported frozen fish transiting Ghana: 63,906 tonnes moved through Tema Port to Burkina Faso in 2023, re-exported import, not Ghanaian catch23. The opening is to attach a grade and traceability to it.

The cheap-fish trade that once dominated this stretch has changed shape, not ended. The saiko transhipment trade, about 100,000 tonnes of trawler bycatch landed through canoes in 2017, was suppressed at sea after 2021 and displaced onto the road as “logo fish” trucked from Tema; the price is the evidence, a box of two slabs now reaching GH¢300 to GH¢600 where a single slab cost GH¢35 to GH¢50 at saiko’s peak24. When cheap undersized fish floods the market, the artisanal fisher cannot command a price for a legal, larger fish, so the sea leak and the on-shore squeeze are one problem seen twice.

🐟 The export leg, and how little of the chain it touches 🐟

Ghana runs a high-value export chain that barely touches the fish most Ghanaians eat. Tuna is landed at 121,297 tonnes worth GH¢3.40 billion25, canned in three Tema factories and sold mostly into Europe: processed tuna to the EU retail market could capture about 74 per cent of the gross profit a tonne26. Ghana exports the processed form and imports the raw one, so it already knows how to run the value-added leg, but for one product, tuna, 28.5 per cent of landings by weight but 34.6 per cent by value27, and one customer bloc.

The export leg is a separate spine: the canneries are vertically integrated and EU-approved, interested in market access, not the domestic chain. The one thread tying the two is the women financiers, who prefinance the tuna companies and carry a quarter of the catch into the local market. The export safeguard arrived in January 2026 with the certification of Ghana’s Atlantic skipjack and yellowfin tuna fisheries to the Marine Stewardship Council standard, covering both the purse seine and the pole-and-line fleets28. The prize is real, already captured by a handful of firms, and almost closed to a new entrant.

🐟 The retail end, and the real margin strategy of the woman who holds the chain 🐟

Many fishmongers double as processor, trader and retailer at once, taking the profit at every stage29. An entrant who occupies one link is out-earned by a woman who occupies four: vertical integration converts control of the first sale into a margin all the way to the plate.

Consumer demand carries the same size-and-quality convention. Premium species such as sea bream, red snapper and croaker go mainly to hotels and restaurants and are now unaffordable for most households, while mackerel and sardines remain in reach30. Fish is not discretionary: households spend about 22 per cent of their food budget on it, poorer households up to 26 per cent31. A premium graded line has two markets already visible, the formal urban retailer and the diaspora export channel, neither supplied by the artisanal chain.

A group of Ghanaian women fish processors and traders meeting under a thatched shelter beside smoking racks, discussing over a ledger book, documentary photograph
One woman, four links
Financier, processor, trader and retailer, often the same person.
22%
of food budget households spend on fish
26%
of food budget for poorer households

🐟 The stakeholder map: who holds power, and who wants the chain to change 🐟

Power over the chain and interest in formalising it are pulling apart: the actors with the most power have the least interest in change, and those who most want a graded, financed chain have the least leverage.

Table 16: Power over the marine fish chain against interest in formalising it
ActorPower over the chainInterest in formalising itWhat it means for an entrant
Trawl companies and their beneficial ownersHighLowThe blocker: profits from the unregulated bycatch trade, so aligns against change
Seafood importers and cold-store ownersHighLowHold 90 per cent of the cold chain; responded to the 2023 levy by routing around it
Big fish mammies and cold-store womenHighLow to mediumFinance the chain and set the price; formalising wage payment has already cut their trade
Tuna canneries and their parentsHighMediumAlready formalised; interested in EU access, not the domestic chain
Ministry and Fisheries CommissionHighHighRuns certification and the closed season; the natural partner for a grading scheme
European Commission, through the IUU regimeHighHighDrives the hygiene and legality standards that a premium chain would be built on
NAFPTA and the women's processor associationsMediumHighOver 14,700 organised women who want a grade; the entrant's first ally
Konkohemaa and small fish mammiesLow to mediumHighSet the beach price but are losing authority; align early or lose the access point
Artisanal canoe owners and crewLowHighCarry the 7.4 per cent margin; will supply a premium chain that pays them for quality

Sources: power and interest are the author's reading of Environmental Justice Foundation (2019, 2021, 2025); Drury O'Neill et al. (2018); United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service (2022); Ocean Risk and Resilience Action Alliance (2025); Nunoo et al. (2015); and Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development (2024). Ratings are analytical, not measured.

Every named actor placed by power over the chain against interest in formalising it
Figure 17 Every named actor placed by power over the chain against interest in formalising it
What this shows

The actors with the most power have the least interest in changing the chain; the actors who most want it graded, certified and financed sit in the top-left corner, with the interest and not the leverage. The women financiers are the hinge: they already fund the chain and set the beach price, and any entrant who cannot bring them across cannot move the chain, because the only actors able to block a change are the ones currently capturing the value.

The engagement implication reads off the grid: build from the top-left cluster, which has the interest and not the power, toward the top-right institutions that can lend authority, and not through the bottom-right actors who hold power and gain nothing from change. Bring the women financiers across and the chain moves; leave them out and it does not.

🐟 The value-capture openings, ranked 🐟

The recoverable value is already quantified in the evidence, and the openings sort by how much control an entrant needs over things nobody currently owns, ordered below from least to most.

Table 17: The openings inside the chain's breaks, ranked by how little an entrant must control
RankThe openingWhy it is openWhat it captures
1A landing-beach grade and a premium buyer behind itNo grading exists; fish is priced by size, so quality is unpaid and unbuiltThe value lost when graded fish is sold ungraded, across 33,000 processors
2Offtake finance against a contract, not against landThe only credit is the fishmonger's advance; women cannot borrow against land they may not ownThe fisher and processor margin that the informal advance now caps
3Landing-site chilling that holds fish in gradeNo cold chain outside four harbours; fresh fish sells within 3 to 12 hoursThe share of the GH¢2.6 billion loss that is downgrade, not spoilage
4Aggregation into a certified line for the formal market159 facilities are certified with no premium buyer; no aggregator existsThe gap between an uncertified beach price and a supermarket or export price
5A formalised cross-border corridor with traceabilityAbout 6,000 tonnes a year already move women-run and untaxedThe recorded, graded value of a trade Ghana currently cannot see or tax

Sources: Owusu (2019); Coastal Resources Center (2021); Nunoo et al. (2015); Asiedu et al. (2022); Ayilu and Nyiawung (2022); DAB Consult for the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, in Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development (2023). The openings are analytical, drawn from the documented breaks in the chain.

🐟 The risks that sit inside the chain 🐟

A fishmonger woman counting cedi banknotes while a canoe crew member holds a basket of fish beside a beached canoe, the price being settled at the point of landing

Competing with the advance that also guarantees the sale

VERY HIGH
What it is

The fishmonger's prefinancing is the only working credit instrument in the chain, repaid in a price concession rather than interest, so it is invisible to any business plan or lender modelling the chain. It caps the fisher's margin at about 7.4 per cent precisely because it also guarantees the sale.

Evidence

The fisher-fishmonger relationship is the most powerful in the chain, the fishmonger informally contracting for the whole catch and funding the trip32. Prefinancing sometimes commits 50 to 100 per cent of a tuna company's landings to its women financiers33.

Who it hits

Any lender, aggregator or offtaker entering the chain expecting to buy fish on a spot market, and any grant committee funding one.

How to manage it, and the opening

Replace both halves of the advance, the cash and the certain buyer, or do not enter; a loan that leaves the fisher to find his own market replaces only the cheaper half. Structure finance to release against a signed offtake that guarantees the sale, routed through the women who already hold the relationship, not past them.

A woman sorting a mixed crate of fish by hand, no grading equipment or labels in sight, fish priced by eye and by size

A chain with no grade and no quality signal

HIGH
What it is

Nobody along the chain is paid for quality, so nobody invests in it. Fish is priced by size and not by weight or grade, which is why the one oven that makes fish safer and exportable loses the processor money, and why a certification scheme now certifies facilities with no premium buyer behind them.

Evidence

Processors reported that Ahotor prices do not compensate for the oven and that it shrinks a fish sold by size34; only 76 of 520 ovens were built without an 88 per cent subsidy35; 159 facilities were certified in 2023 with the premium yet to be documented36.

Who it hits

Any processing, equipment or certification business assuming that a safer or cleaner product sells itself in this chain.

How to manage it, and the opening

Sell the buyer before the processor. Sign an offtaker who pays a measurable premium against a written grade, then finance the equipment against that offtake: the constraint is a missing price signal, not missing technology. The opening is that the grade itself is the product nobody has built.

A woman smoking fish over a traditional oven while other traders and processors work in the background, the informal actor formalisation risks displacing

Formalisation that destroys the actor best placed to capture the value

MEDIUM-HIGH
What it is

The women financiers who hold this chain together capture value through informal credit and informal fish, so a reform that formalises payment can strip them out before a replacement exists. This has already happened twice, and each time small women traders lost their place in the chain.

Evidence

After the saiko ban, fish moved to Tema cold stores and prices passed to “big cold store women”, so many small fish mammies could no longer afford to buy; and converting industrial wages from carton fish to cash removed the fish that fish mammies used to sell37.

Who it hits

Development programmes, lenders and reformers who formalise a link without carrying the informal actors across it, and the women whose livelihoods sit inside the informal step.

How to manage it, and the opening

Design any formalisation so the women who currently capture the value keep capturing it, by financing them into the graded, certified chain instead of past it. The failure to avoid is a clean new structure that works for everyone except the actor who was already doing the job.

A man straining to carry a heavy basket of fish on his head across a crowded landing beach, past women trading at ground level
The layer with no operator
The chain leaks value where it has no operator, not at any single link, and that missing middle is the opening.
🐟 Key takeaways 🐟
01

The chain leaks value where it has no operator, not at any one link. Four are missing: a cold chain outside four harbours, purpose-built transport, a grade, and an aggregator to the formal market.

02

The person who lands the fish keeps a 7.4 per cent margin against the processor's 45 per cent, because the price is set by the woman who prefinanced the trip before the fish is landed.

03

The women financiers are the pivot of the whole chain. They set the beach price, hold the cold stores, and prefinance between 50 and 100 per cent of some tuna companies' landings. No chain change happens without them.

04

The one technology that makes fish safe and exportable loses money because fish is priced by size and not quality. A grade, not a machine, is the missing product, and only 76 of 520 clean ovens were built without an 88 per cent subsidy.

05

The export chain, canned tuna capturing about 74 per cent of its profit at the European shelf, barely touches the fish Ghanaians eat. The domestic prize is the GH¢2.6 billion post-harvest loss, its marine share about 95 per cent, larger than the entire tuna export trade.

Written for each reader

🐟 Practitioner intelligence 🐟

Hover any card to pause and lift it.

For students

If you are thinking of entering, do not start by buying a canoe or an oven. Start where the chain has no operator: spend a season at one landing site learning how the fish is graded, which is to say learning that it is not, and building the relationship with the women who finance the trips. The asset-light entry here is a grade and a book of buyers, not a boat and not a freezer. The mistake first-timers make is assuming they can buy fish on the open market and add value by processing it; the fish is already spoken for by whoever financed the trip, and you enter that arrangement through the fish mammy, not with a purchase order. What you leave with is the relationship and a grading standard nobody else has written down.

For entrepreneurs

First move: sign the premium buyer before any oven, any cold room or any truck. Secure an offtaker, a supermarket, an exporter or a diaspora channel, who will pay a stated premium for graded, certified smoked fish, and get the grade written down. Then finance the equipment against that offtake contract, then secure supply through the women financiers rather than around them. The trap this chain punishes hardest is buying the technology first: the Ahotor oven proves that a safer, cleaner product loses money when no buyer pays for quality.

For investors

The thesis: value in this chain is captured by controlling the transaction, not by adding processing, so the return sits in creating the grade and offtake the chain currently lacks. Three diligence asks follow. Require any processing or aggregation venture to show a signed offtake with a premium stated against a written grade, because a certified facility with no premium buyer is the 2023 scheme's unsolved problem, not a business. Require its supply plan to run through the women financiers, not around them, and treat their absence from the cap table as a finding. Require the loss it targets to be named as value loss, the 22.5 per cent worth GH¢2.6 billion, and not physical spoilage, which is under five per cent. Release the cheque against a signed offtake and a measured premium, and underwrite the grade, not the throughput.

For ecosystem actors

The lever: a national fish grading standard tied to the existing certification scheme, cheap against what it unlocks. Publishing a grade, and a monthly landing-beach price series by species and grade, would let a premium form and move a measurable number: the share of the 22.5 per cent post-harvest value loss that is recovered, and the share of certified facilities that can command a price for being certified, currently unmeasured. Attach finance for the graded chain to the women's associations who already run it. The failure to avoid is the one this sector has repeated: subsidising equipment, the ovens, the cold stores, ahead of the grade and the buyer that would make the equipment pay, which is why 88 per cent subsidies bought ovens that sat unused.

Where this connects.The two fisheries and the bait dependency under the tuna leg are Pillar 1; the trade totals, import flows and export concentration are Pillar 2; the saiko and logo-fish enforcement story and the trawl licence regime that leaks value at sea are Pillar 3; the fleets, crew shares and premix distribution are Pillar 4; the vessel and firm economics, the cost of the fishmonger’s advance and the loss-recovery business this pillar locates are Pillar 5; and the finance instruments and statutory reforms that would let an offtake-backed loan replace the advance are Pillar 8.

Footnotes
  1. Nunoo et al. (2015).↑
  2. Asiedu et al. (2022).↑
  3. Drury O'Neill et al. (2018).↑
  4. Ayilu & Nyiawung (2022).↑
  5. Nunoo et al. (2015).↑
  6. Asiedu et al. (2022).↑
  7. Asiedu et al. (2022).↑
  8. Asiedu et al. (2022).↑
  9. Ocean Risk and Resilience Action Alliance (2025).↑
  10. Drury O'Neill et al. (2018).↑
  11. Nunoo et al. (2015).↑
  12. Owusu (2019).↑
  13. Owusu (2019).↑
  14. Coastal Resources Center (2021).↑
  15. Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development (2024).↑
  16. Nunoo et al. (2015).↑
  17. Asiedu et al. (2022).↑
  18. United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service (2022).↑
  19. Osei-Bonsu (2026).↑
  20. DAB Consult for the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (2023).↑
  21. Nunoo et al. (2015).↑
  22. Ayilu and Nyiawung (2022).↑
  23. Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development (2024).↑
  24. Environmental Justice Foundation (2025).↑
  25. Fisheries Commission (2023).↑
  26. Drury O'Neill et al. (2018).↑
  27. Fisheries Commission (2023).↑
  28. Marine Stewardship Council (2026).↑
  29. Nunoo et al. (2015).↑
  30. United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service (2022).↑
  31. Ocean Risk and Resilience Action Alliance (2025).↑
  32. Asiedu et al. (2022).↑
  33. Drury O'Neill et al. (2018).↑
  34. Owusu (2019).↑
  35. Coastal Resources Center (2021).↑
  36. Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development (2024).↑
  37. Ocean Risk and Resilience Action Alliance (2025).↑
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