Ghana Agribusiness Playbook← Rice
Rubber-roller mill with destoning and grading, and branded rice packs
Rice · Pillar 05

Cost and Returns

On 2020 prices irrigated rice earned about four times the rain-fed margin per hectare, and on a milled-rice basis the value of a kilogram roughly doubles between the paddy floor and the shelf, much of it captured at the mill, the store and the brand.
Cost and Returns · Pillar 05

It asks what it costs to grow, mill and brand rice in Ghana, and where along that path the money is actually made. The short answer, and the reason this playbook keeps pointing downstream, is that growing paddy earns a margin that is exposed to weather and price and can vanish in a glut, while milling, parboiling and branding earn steadier margins on volume. A farmer who only grows and sells raw paddy is doing the hardest, riskiest work for the smallest reward; the value is captured by whoever turns that paddy into clean, branded rice. Understanding that split is the difference between a rice business that makes money and one that joins the 2026 glut of unsold paddy.

Inside a Ghanaian rice mill, machinery cleaning and grading rice
Where value is added
Water sets the farm margin, and value is added after the farm gate.
~2x
value from the paddy floor to the shelf, on a milled-rice basis
GH¢7.70 to 17
a kilogram of milled rice, from paddy at the GH¢5 floor to local fragrant rice on the shelf (March 2026)
Downstream
much of the added value goes to the miller, the trader and the brand

🌾 Growing paddy: irrigation pays, rain-fed barely does 🌾

Irrigated rice earns roughly four times the margin of rain-fed rice
GHS 3,940GHS 3,890TotalcostGHS 9,970GHS 5,310RevenueGHS 6,030GHS 1,420Grossmargin
IrrigatedRain-fed
Source: Zakaria et al. (2021), per acre converted to per hectare, 2020 prices.
Figure 11 Irrigated rice earns roughly four times the margin of rain-fed rice
What this shows

The irrigated farmer keeps a real profit while the rain-fed farmer barely breaks even. The figures come from a 2020 farm survey, so the ratio matters more than the cedi amounts: the money in growing rice is in water control, and without it farming paddy is a thin and risky business.

The most detailed Ghanaian farm budget for rice uses field data from 2020, from a survey of 543 farmers in the Northern, Savannah and Upper East regions1. Input costs have risen since, while paddy prices fell in the 2025 to 2026 glut, so the cedi figures below show the ratios between ecologies, and between farming and milling, rather than a current budget. The companion Cost and Returns Model lets a reader enter current costs and prices.

The first lesson is that the ecology decides whether farming rice makes money at all. A survey of 543 rice farmers in the Northern, Savannah and Upper East regions found that, on 2020 prices, irrigated rice returned a profit of about GH¢2,442 an acre (about GH¢6,000 a hectare), more than four times the roughly GH¢576 an acre (about GH¢1,400 a hectare) from rain-fed rice, and that for every cedi spent the irrigated farmer got about GH¢2.53 back against just GH¢1.37 for the rain-fed one1.

In other words, irrigated rice is a solid business and rain-fed rice, at average yields, barely clears its costs and tips into a loss in a bad year. This is the same message as the yield and planting pillars, now in cedis: water control is what turns rice from a subsistence gamble into a profitable enterprise.

GH¢6,030 / ha
irrigated profit at 2020 prices, about four times rain-fed
GH¢2.53 vs 1.37
returned per cedi spent, irrigated against rain-fed (2020)

🌾 Indicative cost and returns for growing rice, by ecology 🌾

Table 3: Indicative cost and returns for growing rice, by ecology, per hectare, at 2020 prices
Item (per hectare, one season, 2020 prices)IrrigatedRain-fed lowland
Total production costabout GH¢3,940about GH¢3,890
Paddy harvested (survey farmers)about 7.2 tonnesabout 5.9 tonnes
Paddy price receivedabout GH¢1.39 a kgabout GH¢0.90 a kg
Revenueabout GH¢9,970about GH¢5,310
Gross margin (profit)about GH¢6,030about GH¢1,420
Return per cedi spent (cost-benefit ratio)about GH¢2.53about GH¢1.37
Land development, one-off (separate)about GH¢25,000 to 50,000about GH¢25,000 to 50,000

Annual figures are in 2020 cedis from a survey of 543 farmers in the Northern, Savannah and Upper East regions, converted from per acre to per hectare; the survey farmers' yields are well above the national average of 3.33 tonnes a hectare, and irrigated farmers sold more in the lean season at a higher price. Input costs are higher in 2026, while paddy prices fell in the 2025 to 2026 glut. Land development is a one-off capital cost, not an annual cost.

Sources: Zakaria et al. (2021), converted from per acre to per hectare; Coalition for African Rice Development (2025) for land development (2023 costs).12

The second lesson is how fragile even that margin is, which the 2026 glut showed in the cruellest way. The farm-gate profit above assumes the farmer can sell paddy at a fair price. When the market collapsed, farmers at Tono and Fumbisi reported paddy selling at about GH¢700 for a 220 kilogram bag, around GH¢3.20 a kilogram, well below the GH¢5 a kilogram floor3, many farmers could not recover their costs4. The break-even point for a rice farmer is not a fixed number; it moves with the price a buyer will actually pay. This is why every serious rice enterprise in this playbook is built around a secured buyer and, better still, around owning the milling and branding that set the price, rather than around growing paddy and hoping.

GH¢3.20
a kilogram of paddy at Tono and Fumbisi in the glut, below the GH¢5 floor3
GH¢1,420 / ha
rain-fed profit at 2020 prices, which a crash like the 2026 glut can erase
A Ghanaian rice farmer at the farm gate with a sack of raw paddy beside a harvested field
The most risk
Growing raw paddy carries the most risk, and its price collapsed in the 2026 glut.

🌾 Inflation and a moving market 🌾

Costs and prices also move with the wider economy, in both directions. Inflation eased from 23.5 percent in January 2025 to 3.2 percent in March 2026, the lowest reading since the consumer price index was rebased in 2021, then edged back up to 5.0 percent by August 2026, with food inflation at 3.0 percent567. Much of what a rice business buys is imported, including fertiliser, herbicides, tractors, combine harvesters and milling machinery, so its cedi cost follows the exchange rate. The cedi lost about 9.5 percent against the US dollar in the first nine months of 20268, and the World Bank expects fertiliser prices to rise about 31 percent in 2026, with urea ending the year about 60 percent above 20259. The exchange rate also sets the price of the competition. The stronger cedi of 2025 made imported rice cheaper and pulled local prices down with it, while a weaker cedi makes imports dearer again, so the same currency move can raise a local miller’s input costs and improve its price position at once10. Borrowing has become cheaper: the Bank of Ghana held its policy rate at 14 percent in September 2026, and the average bank lending rate fell to about 15.9 percent in August 202611. A cost build that holds one season can be wrong the next, and a fall in the paddy price can arrive in the same year as a rise in input costs. Re-cost inputs every season, keep a buffer against both a price fall and a cost rise, and prefer off-take contracts that fix the price or tie it to costs.

5.0%
inflation in August 2026, up from a 3.2% low in March; costs and prices move with it
-9.5%
the cedi against the US dollar, January to September 2026

🌾 Model it yourself 🌾

Table 3 is one thing. Move the levers yourself. Pick the ecology, then set the yield, the farm-gate paddy price and the total cost to your own field’s figures and swing them one at a time. Push the yield or the price slider and watch the margin move fast, then push the cost slider and watch it move about 40 percent as much. The defaults are 2020 survey values, so enter your own current costs and price. The farm-gate margin is made mostly by tonnes and price, and it is exposed to a price fall like the 2026 glut.

Tool 1

Does the hectare clear a margin?

Pick the ecology, which sets the base cost, then slide the three levers a grower can hold: the paddy yield in tonnes a hectare, the farm-gate price a buyer pays, and the total production cost. Watch the gross margin move off the break-even line. The defaults are 2020 survey values; enter your own current costs and price. On that basis the irrigated base cleared about GH¢6,030 a hectare and the rain-fed base about GH¢1,420, which a crash like the 2026 glut can erase.

GH¢9,974
Revenue, 7.2 t at GH¢1.39/kg
GH¢3,938
Total production cost, break-even at GH¢0.55/kg
+GH¢6,036GH¢2.53 back per cedi
gross margin a hectare, against the GH¢6,035 the irrigated base makes
At these numbers the hectare clears a gross margin of GH¢6,036, about 100 per cent of the irrigated base, returning GH¢2.53 for every cedi spent, and break-even sits at only GH¢0.55 a kilogram. Notice what carries it. Push the yield or the price slider and the margin moves fast; push the cost slider and it moves about 40 percent as much. The margin is made by tonnes and the price you sell into, so the durable work is water control, clean seed and agronomy for the yield, and a secured buyer or your own milling and branding for the price, more than shaving a cost line.

Base case, per hectare, one season, 2020 prices, irrigated: about 7.2 t/ha at GH¢1.39/kg gives revenue about GH¢9,970; taking off the GH¢3,940/ha production cost leaves a gross margin of about GH¢6,030, GH¢2.53 back for every cedi spent, with break-even about GH¢0.55/kg. The rain-fed base is about 5.9 t/ha at GH¢0.90/kg on GH¢3,890 cost, for a margin of about GH¢1,420. These match Table 3. The survey farmers’ yields are well above the national average of 3.33 t/ha. One-off land development, about GH¢25,000 to 50,000 a hectare, is a separate capital cost, not an annual one. Source: Ghana Rice Cost and Returns Model v2 (2020 Budget sheet).

Tool 2

What swings the margin most

The same model, re-run as a sensitivity read. Each bar is how far the gross margin moves when that one driver changes by 20 per cent, holding the others where you left them. Two drivers lead and tie, and the cost line comes third.

1. Paddy yield, in tonnes a hectare±GH¢1,995

How many tonnes the hectare actually brings in, driven by water control (irrigated beats rain-fed on this model), clean certified seed and agronomy. It acts straight on revenue, so it is a joint-widest lever, and it is the one the grower can build. On the Sensitivity sheet, moving down the yield rows swings the margin as hard as moving across the price columns.

2. Farm-gate paddy price, per kilogram±GH¢1,995

The price a buyer will actually pay, set by the market, and it is volatile. It moves the margin exactly as much as yield does, and in the 2026 glut farmers at Tono and Fumbisi reported paddy at about GH¢3.20 a kilogram, below the GH¢5 floor, and many could not recover their costs. Lifting and securing it runs through a named buyer and through owning the milling and branding downstream.

3. Total production cost, per hectare±GH¢788

The whole production bill, land preparation, seed, fertiliser, agrochemicals, labour, water, threshing, drying and transport. It is the one lever the operator controls directly, but because it does not multiply out through revenue it swings the margin about 40 percent as much as yield or price. Worth trimming, but yield and price matter more.

±GH¢1,995
What a 20 per cent change in yield or in price does to the margin
±GH¢788
What a 20 per cent change in the total cost does, about 40 percent as much
Yield and the farm-gate price swing the margin most and by the same amount: at the irrigated base a 20 percent change in either moves the margin by about GH¢1,995 a hectare, and a 20 percent change in cost by about GH¢790, so yield and price move it about 2.5 times as much as cost. That is what the Sensitivity sheet shows. The farm-gate margin is made mostly by tonnes and price, and it is exposed to a price fall like the 2026 glut. The steadier margin is captured downstream, in milling, parboiling and branding.

Sensitivity holds two levers where you left them and moves the third by 20 per cent: yield and price both act on revenue (margin = yield × 1000 × price − cost), so they lead and tie; the total production cost does not multiply through revenue, so it swings the margin less, because revenue is about 2.5 times cost. Ranks match the Sensitivity sheet of the Ghana Rice Cost and Returns Model v2 (2020 Budget sheet).

🌾 Milling and branding: where the margin actually lives 🌾

Now follow the same kilogram of rice past the farm gate, and the picture changes completely. Paddy leaves the farm at, at best, the GH¢5 a kilogram floor that NAFCO set for paddy, and in the glut often for far less; at 65 percent milling recovery, GH¢5 of paddy works out at about GH¢7.70 for each kilogram of milled rice it yields. Milling it into clean white rice, then destoning, grading and branding it, lifts its value at every step, and well-milled local fragrant rice retailed at about GH¢17 a kilogram in March 2026 (GH¢425 for a 25 kilogram bag), against about GH¢26 for imported Thai fragrant rice and GH¢13 for Vietnamese10. On a milled-rice basis the value roughly doubles between the paddy and the shelf, and that added value goes mainly to the miller, the trader and the brand.

Branded packs of premium local Ghanaian rice stacked on a retail shelf
About GH¢17 a kilogram
Local fragrant rice sold for about GH¢17 a kilogram on the shelf in March 2026, against GH¢13 for Vietnamese.
Most of the value in rice is added after the farm gate
Figure 12 Most of the value in rice is added after the farm gate
What this shows

On a milled-rice basis, paddy bought at the GH¢5 floor is worth about GH¢7.70 a kilogram, and local fragrant rice sold for about GH¢17 a kilogram on the shelf in March 2026, so the value roughly doubles after the farm gate. Vietnamese rice sold for about GH¢13 a kilogram, which is the price local rice has to beat or justify. Whoever owns those steps can capture that value, which makes milling and branding the more rewarding end of the business when paddy is cheap.

55% to 65%
milling recovery, an old Engelberg against a rubber-roller mill
47% to 67%
whole head-rice grains, a poor local machine against a modern mill
Machinery inside a mid-sized Ghanaian rice mill destoning and grading rice
Recovery and head-rice
A mill that recovers more and breaks less earns more from every tonne, twice over.

Two things decide whether a mill captures that value or wastes it. The first is recovery, how much milled rice comes out of a tonne of paddy: a small, old Engelberg mill recovers only about 55 percent, while a rubber-roller mill recovers about 65 percent, so a better machine yields roughly a fifth more sellable rice from the same paddy12. Such old single-pass mills are now rare: they fell from 79 percent of Ghana’s mills in 2010 to 8 percent in 202213. The second is head-rice, the share of whole rather than broken grains: in a Ghanaian field trial an SB30 mill produced about 67 percent whole grains against about 47 percent from a locally made machine, and whole grains are what fetch the premium14. A mill that recovers more and breaks less earns more from every tonne, twice over. That is why the milling upgrade is one of the strongest investments in the chain, developed further in the value-chain pillar.

What does a mill cost. A Ghanaian rice plant at Sefwi Akontombra combining parboiling, milling and packaging at about 1.5 to 2.8 tonnes an hour cost around US$1.1 million, then about GH¢6.7 million, when it opened in 202115. A survey of Ghanaian mills in 2021 to 2022 put the average cost of medium-scale mills of 1 to 3 tonnes an hour at about €342,000, and of improved small mills with destoners at about €19,00013. That is a serious but not impossible sum, and it sits squarely in the range the finance rails below are built to support. In April 2026 the President said a state rice mill was under construction on the Yendi Road in Tamale, with another planned for the Fumbisi Valley, to supply the buffer stock company and school feeding16. Neither was running in mid-2026, so the near-term opportunity is in mid-sized private and cooperative mills.

US$1.1 m
the Sefwi Akontombra parboiling, milling and packaging plant, about GH¢6.7 million in 2021
€342,000
average cost of a medium-scale 1 to 3 t/hr mill (2021 to 2022 survey)

🌾 Parboiling: a low-cost way to add value, done mostly by women

Improved parboiling: a low-cost route to better, higher-value rice
Figure 13 Improved parboiling: a low-cost route to better, higher-value rice
What this shows

Parboiling is a low-capital way to raise the quality and value of local rice, and it is largely a women's business. Improved equipment raised parboilers' output and income, by about 18 percent in a Benin study, while cutting the drudgery, which makes parboiling one of the most accessible entry points in the whole crop.

A Ghanaian woman parboiling rice paddy in a steaming pot over a wood fire
Largely a women's business
Improved parboiling raises milled output and income for a fraction of a mill's cost, and it is largely a women's business.

There is a cheaper route to better, higher-value rice that does not need a million-dollar mill, and it is one women largely own. Parboiling, partly boiling the paddy before milling, hardens the grain so that less breaks in milling and more nutrients are kept, which raises both the recovery and the grade. Improved parboiling equipment, the GEM system promoted by AfricaRice, cuts the firewood, the smoke and the time involved; in Benin, women who adopted it got about 14 kilograms more milled rice from every 100 kilograms of paddy and about 18 percent more income17. Two Mini GEM parboiling units were installed for women processors at Nyankpala and Kumbungu in the Northern Region in March 202618.

about 18%
more income for parboilers using improved kit (Benin study)
March 2026
two Mini GEM units installed at Nyankpala and Kumbungu

🌾 The finance to build these businesses exists 🌾

Finance for a mill or a parboiling enterprise is available through several channels. Borrowing is still expensive, the Bank of Ghana held its policy rate at 14 percent in September 2026, and the average bank lending rate fell to about 15.9 percent in August 2026 from 24.2 percent a year earlier, but two things soften that11. First, the national agricultural guarantee scheme, GIRSAL, can cover up to 70 percent of a loan’s principal, decided case by case, which makes banks more willing to lend; by July 2026 it had guaranteed GH¢1.85 billion of loans for 6,695 beneficiaries through 40 partner financial institutions1920. Second, the Development Bank Ghana and GIRSAL agreed in February 2024 to make GH¢500 million available over five years, through partner banks at preferential rates, for agribusinesses in rice, maize, soya, poultry and cassava21; by September 2026 the Development Bank Ghana had disbursed more than GH¢2.5 billion since it began, over half of it to agriculture, agribusiness and manufacturing22. In August 2026 the African Development Bank also approved a US$18.8 million grant for Ghana’s rice sector that includes modernising processing facilities23. On top of that, a rice mill or parboiling plant is an agro-processing business, which qualifies for concessionary income-tax rates for agro-processing, with lower rates for plants sited outside the regional capitals, which suits the north where most paddy grows24. With these rails in place, the harder task is a bankable plan built around milling and a buyer.

A Ghanaian entrepreneur and a loan officer reviewing agribusiness finance paperwork and a business plan
The barrier is the plan
With these rails in place, the harder task is a bankable plan built around milling and a buyer.
up to 70%
of a loan's principal, decided case by case (GIRSAL)
GH¢500 m
agreed in February 2024 for rice, maize, soya, poultry and cassava
5%
concessionary agro-processing income-tax rate for the first five years
🌾 The Opening: where the returns actually are 🌾
01

Own a step downstream as well as, or instead of, the farm. On a milled-rice basis the value roughly doubles between the paddy floor and the shelf, and much of it goes to the miller, the trader and the brand. A mid-sized rubber-roller mill with destoning and grading, or a branded packing line, captures the return that growing paddy alone never will.

02

Parboiling is the accessible entry. It raises milled output and income, by about 18 percent in a Benin study, for a fraction of a mill's cost, it is largely a women's business, and improved equipment is arriving. A parboiling and small-milling enterprise is one of the lowest-capital openings in the crop.

03

Raise recovery and cut breakage. A better machine yields about a fifth more sellable rice and far more whole grain from the same paddy, so upgrading an existing poor mill raises the output from every tonne of paddy; test the payback against the mill's own throughput.

04

Use the finance rails. GIRSAL's guarantee, the Development Bank Ghana facility and the agro-processing tax break are built for exactly these businesses. A bankable milling or parboiling plan with a secured buyer can access capital that pure farming struggles to reach.

🌾 The risks that sit inside the numbers 🌾

A Ghanaian rice farmer standing beside sacks of unsold raw paddy at a rural market, looking worried as prices collapse, documentary photograph

Relying on the farm-gate margin

HIGH
What it is

Growing and selling raw paddy earns a thin margin that vanishes when the price falls. In the 2026 glut, distressed paddy sold below the cost of growing it, wiping out farmers who had no mill or buyer to fall back on.

Evidence

Rain-fed rice returned only about GH¢576 an acre (about GH¢1,400 a hectare) on 2020 prices1, and in the 2026 glut farmers at Tono and Fumbisi reported paddy at about GH¢3.20 a kilogram, below the GH¢5 floor3.

Who it hits

Farmers and investors whose plan ends at selling paddy.

How to manage it, and the opening

Build the plan around a secured buyer or, better, around owning the milling and branding that set the price. Treat pure paddy production as the raw-material stage and look for the profit downstream.

🌾 Key takeaways 🌾
01

Growing paddy carries the most risk; the value roughly doubles between paddy and shelf rice on a milled-rice basis, and much of that added value is captured downstream at the mill and the brand.

02

Water control decides whether farming rice pays: irrigated rice returns about four times the margin of rain-fed rice, which barely clears its costs in an average year.

03

A mill's return depends on recovery and head-rice: a rubber-roller mill yields about a fifth more rice and far more whole grain than an old Engelberg one, so upgrading a poor mill can repay its cost over time.

04

Improved parboiling raises milled output and income for a fraction of a mill's cost, is largely a women's business, and improved equipment is now arriving in the north.

05

The finance rails exist, GIRSAL's guarantee of up to 70 percent, the Development Bank Ghana facility and the agro-processing tax concessions, so the main task is a bankable milling-and-buyer plan.

Written for each reader

🌾 Practitioner intelligence 🌾

Hover any card to pause and lift it.

For students

If you are entering rice, learn to read a cost and returns sheet, because it tells you the truth the marketing does not: growing paddy is thin and risky, and the money is in milling, parboiling and branding. Learn to build a simple budget for a mill or a parboiling unit, and you can work in agribusiness finance, in a processor's operations, or run a small parboiling enterprise yourself. The gap to fill: few people in the chain can actually model where the margin is, so they chase volume and get caught in gluts. The trap to avoid is treating old cedi figures in any report as current; price a plan with today's quotes before you act.

For entrepreneurs

First move: build your plan around a downstream step, a rubber-roller mill with destoning and grading, or a parboiling and packing unit, and around a named buyer. Model the recovery, the head-rice and the branded price, because that is where your margin comes from. The trap: financing paddy production with no mill or buyer, which left many farmers with unsold stock in 2026 when the grain export ban shut out buyers from the Sahel. The tailwind is real: the GIRSAL guarantee, the Development Bank Ghana agribusiness facility and the agro-processing tax break are built for a milling or parboiling plant, especially in the north.

For investors

Diligence asks: the thesis is that the return in rice is downstream, in milling, parboiling and branding, protected by recovery, head-rice and a brand. Ask for the mill's recovery and head-rice assumptions, the branded price and how it is achieved, the secured off-take, and a cost model priced with current 2026 quotes. Structure the money as equipment and working capital for a processing-and-branding business, using the GIRSAL guarantee to share risk, released against recovery, quality and sales milestones. The risk: do not fund paddy production alone, and do not accept margins built on old prices; the farm-gate margin collapsed in the 2026 glut, and the steadier returns go to whoever owns the milling, the brand and the buyer relationship.

For ecosystem actors

The lever is shifting finance and support from paddy production toward milling, parboiling and branding, and toward the water control that makes farming pay. Encouraging production without the processing and market to absorb it, together with the grain export ban that shut out buyers from the Sahel, helped create the 2026 glut. Fund and measure the number of upgraded mills and parboiling units financed, the take-up of the GIRSAL guarantee and the Development Bank Ghana facility by processors, and the share of paddy that is milled to standard. The measurable outcome is more paddy turned into branded local rice at a profit, and fewer farmers left holding unsold stock. The failure to avoid is subsidising more paddy into a market that cannot mill or sell it.

Footnotes
  1. Zakaria, A., Azumah, S. B., Dagunga, G., & Appiah-Twumasi, M. (2021). Profitability analysis of rice production: A microeconomic perspective from northern Ghana. Agricultural Finance Review, 81(4), 535-553. https://doi.org/10.1108/AFR-07-2020-0108↑
  2. Coalition for African Rice Development. (2025, May 21). Ghana, May 2025: An interview with the Director of Crop Services of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. https://riceforafrica.net/ghana-may-2025/↑
  3. Ghana News Agency. (2025, October 31). National Food Buffer Stock seeks additional GH¢100m to purchase surplus paddy rice. Ghana Business News. https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2025/10/31/national-food-buffer-stock-seeks-additional-gh%C2%A2100m-to-purchase-surplus-paddy-rice/↑
  4. Tankeh, K. W. (2026, June 18). Rice farmers abandon farms over 700,000-tonne unsold rice. The Business & Financial Times. https://thebftonline.com/2026/06/18/rice-farmers-abandon-farms-over-700000-tonne-unsold-rice/↑
  5. Lartey, N. L. (2025, December 4). From 23% to 6%: Ghana's 2025 inflation slowdown, the context and economic signals. Citi Newsroom. https://www.citinewsroom.com/2025/12/from-23-to-6-ghanas-2025-inflation-slowdown-the-context-and-economic-signals/↑
  6. Ntow, F. (2026, April 1). Ghana's inflation falls to 3.2 per cent in March 2026. Ghana News Agency. https://gna.org.gh/2026/04/ghanas-inflation-falls-to-3-2-per-cent-in-march-2026/↑
  7. Nixon, C. (2026a, September 2). Inflation rises to 5.0% in August 2026. MyJoyOnline. https://www.myjoyonline.com/ghanas-inflation-rises-to-5-0-in-august-2026/↑
  8. Nixon, C. (2026b, September 23). Cedi depreciates by 9.5% in nine months of 2026: BoG. MyJoyOnline. https://www.myjoyonline.com/cedi-depreciates-by-9-5-in-nine-months-of-2026-bog/↑
  9. Karikari, N. (2026, May 5). World Bank projects sharp rise in fertiliser prices for 2026, warns of food inflation risks. GBC Ghana Online. https://www.gbcghanaonline.com/news/business/world-bank-fertiliser/2026/↑
  10. Taylor, J., Beillard, M. J., & Galloway, J. D. (2026). Ghana grain and feed annual - 2026 (GAIN Report No. GH2026-0011). United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain+and+Feed+Annual_Accra_Ghana_GH2026-0011.pdf↑
  11. Bank of Ghana. (2026b, September 24). Monetary Policy Committee press release [Press release]. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/MPC-Press-Release-September-2026.pdf↑
  12. Ministry of Food and Agriculture. (2024). National rice development strategy 2 (NRDS II: 2019-2030). Coalition for African Rice Development. https://riceforafrica.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/gha_nrds2.pdf↑
  13. Laurent, R., Soullier, G., Le Coq, J.-F., & Milhorance, C. (2025). Agricultural value chain transformations: A comparative analysis of milling segment upgrading in the rice value chains in Ghana and Ivory Coast. Journal of Rural Studies, 114, Article 103570. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2025.103570↑
  14. Appiah, F., Guisse, R., & Dartey, P. K. A. (2011). Post-harvest losses of rice from harvesting to milling in Ghana. Journal of Stored Products and Postharvest Research, 2(4), 64-71. https://academicjournals.org/article/article1379942599_Appiah%20et%20al.pdf↑
  15. Ghana launches US$1.1m rice processing facility with modern parboiling, milling, packaging plants. (2021, September 6). Food Business Africa. https://www.foodbusinessafrica.com/ghana-launches-us1-1m-rice-processing-facility-with-modern-parboiling-milling-packaging-plants/↑
  16. Fugu, M. (2026, April 20). President outlines measures to tackle food glut: Cuts sod for 24-hour markets. Graphic Online. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ghana-news-president-outlines-measures-to-tackle-food-glut-cuts-sod-for-24-hour-markets.html↑
  17. Arouna, A., Aboudou, R., & Ndindeng, S. A. (2023). The adoption and impacts of improved parboiling technology for rice value chain upgrading on the livelihood of women rice parboilers in Benin. Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, 7, Article 1066418. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2023.1066418↑
  18. Gumah, S. (2026, March 24). CSIR-SARI, partners install rice parboiling machine for women processors. Ghana News Agency. https://gna.org.gh/2026/03/csir-sari-partners-install-rice-parboiling-machine-for-women-processors/↑
  19. GIRSAL (Ghana Incentive-Based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending). (n.d.). Agricultural credit guarantee scheme. Retrieved September 27, 2026, from https://www.girsal.com/agricultural-credit-guarantee-scheme/↑
  20. GIRSAL (Ghana Incentive-Based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending). (2026, July 23). GIRSAL holds 2026 annual general meeting (AGM). https://www.girsal.com/2026/07/23/girsal-holds-2026-annual-general-meeting-agm/↑
  21. GIRSAL (Ghana Incentive-Based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending). (2024, February 21). GIRSAL and DBG extend partnership to boost agricultural financing for growth and self-reliance. https://www.girsal.com/2024/02/21/girsal-and-dbg-extend-partnership-to-boost-agricultural-financing-for-growth-and-self-reliance/↑
  22. Ibrahim, A. (2026, September 3). DBG disburses over GH¢2.5bn in 5 years to agriculture, manufacturing and women-led firms. MyJoyOnline. https://www.myjoyonline.com/dbg-disburses-over-gh%C2%A22-5bn-in-5-years-to-agriculture-manufacturing-and-women-led-firms/↑
  23. African Development Bank. (2026, August 3). Ghana: African Development Bank approves $18.8 million grant to boost rice production [Press release]. https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/ghana-african-development-bank-approves-188-million-grant-boost-rice-production-96002↑
  24. PwC. (2026, March 11). Ghana: Corporate, tax credits and incentives. Worldwide Tax Summaries. https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ghana/corporate/tax-credits-and-incentives↑
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